Optimal dynamic matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL); Princeton University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3740
• 发表日期: 2020-07-01
• 页码: 1221-1278
• 关键词: Dynamic matching; mechanism design; market design; child adoption; organ donation; C61; C78; D47

摘要

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a trade-off between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by alternative priority protocols.