Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Noda, Shunya
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2226
• 发表日期: 2019-01-01
• 页码: 39-69
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; perfect Bayesian equilibrium; within-period ex post implementation; revenue maximization; full surplus extraction; C73; D47; D82; D86

摘要

We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and for implementability of the targeted allocation rule (weak detectability) in this one-shot problem. We decompose the general dynamic problem into one-shot problems, and obtain sufficient conditions for surplus extraction and implementation.