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作者：Okat, Deniz
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：Individuals being audited potentially learn how to exploit the weaknesses inherent in any audit methodology if they face the same method many times. Hence, an auditor better deters fraud by randomizing her choice of methodology over time, thereby frustrating a would-be fraudster's ability to learn. In the extreme, an auditor benefits from refusing to audit, even though audits are costless to her.
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作者：Golman, Russell; Klepper, Steven
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Geographic clustering of innovative industries is associated with the entry and success of spinoff firms. We develop a model to explain the multiple empirical patterns regarding cluster growth and spinoff formation and performance, without relying on agglomeration externalities. Clustering naturally follows from spinoffs locating near their parents. In our model, firms grow and spinoffs form through the discovery of new submarkets based on innovation. Rapid and successful innovation creates mo...
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作者：Han, Lu; Hong, Seung-Hyun
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in-house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incent...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Varas, Felipe
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University
摘要：We study disclosure dynamics when the firm value evolves stochastically over time. The presence of litigation risk, arising from the failure to disclose unfavorable information, crowds out positive disclosures. Litigation risk mitigates firms' tendency to use inefficient disclosure policies. From a policy perspective, we show that a stricter legal environment may be an efficient way to stimulate information transmission in capital markets, particularly when the nature of information is proprie...
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作者：Hunold, Matthias; Stahl, Konrad
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is profitable when controlling acquisition is not. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, thus delegating commitment to the supplier, and with it high input prices, allowing ...
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作者：Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Moeller, Marc
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bern
摘要：We use a mechanism-design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade-off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first-best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second...
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作者：Newberry, Peter W.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This article provides an empirical examination of observational learning. Using data from an online market for music, I find that observational learning benefits consumers, producers of high-quality music, and the online platform. I also study the role of pricing as a friction to the learning process by comparing outcomes under demand-based pricing to counterfactual pricing schemes. I find that employing a fixed price (the industry standard) can hamper learning by reducing the incentive to exp...
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作者：Fox, Jeremy T.; Gandhi, Amit
作者单位：Rice University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We show how to nonparametrically identify the distribution of unobservables, such as random coefficients, that characterizes the heterogeneity among consumers in multinomial choice models. We provide general identification conditions for a class of nonlinear models and then verify these conditions using the primitives of the multinomial choice model. We require that the distribution of unobservables lie in the class of all distributions with finite support, which under our most general assumpt...
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作者：Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We compare two commonly used mechanisms in public procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a general characterization of both mechanisms based on public scrutiny requirements and showcontrary to conventional wisdomthat an intransparent negotiation always yields higher social surplus than a transparen...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Ciliberto, Federico; Liaukonyte, Jura; Renault, Regis
作者单位：University of Virginia; Cornell University; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We derive equilibrium incentives to use comparative advertising that pushes up own brand perception and pulls down the brand image of targeted rivals. Data on content and spending for all TV advertisements in Over-The- Counter (OTC) analgesics enable us to construct matrices of rival targeting expenditures and estimate the structural model. Using brands' optimal choices, these attack matrices identify diversion ratios, from which we derive comparative advertising damage measures. We find that ...
