Project selection and execution in teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Moeller, Marc
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bern
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12122
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 166-185
• 关键词: DECISION-MAKING; INFORMATION; committees

摘要

We use a mechanism-design approach to study a team whose members select a joint project and exert individual efforts to execute it. Members have private information about the qualities of alternative projects. Information sharing is obstructed by a trade-off between adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first-best project and effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the team grows in size. We also characterize the second-best mechanism and find that it may include a motivational bias, that is, a bias in favor of the team's initially preferred project, and higher-than-optimal effort by uninformed team members.