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作者：Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：I study optimal contracting where the principal can verify the agent's private information via auditing but cannot contractually commit to audit frequency. Optimal contracting requires sophisticated communication: the agent reports his information to a mediator, who randomly selects a contract. Mediation allows for fine-tuning the information flow, because the principal observes the selected contract but not the agent's report. Simply offering a menu of contracts is, in general, not optimal. I...
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作者：Lemus, Jorge; Temnyalov, Emil
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We model patent privateeringwhereby producing firms sell patents to Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), which then license them under the threat of litigationin a bargaining game. PAEs can negotiate higher licensing fees than producing firms because they cannot be countersued for infringement. Privateering produces two countervailing effects: it increases the offensive value of patents, whereas it decreases their defensive value and lowers the aggregate surplus of producing firms. Embedding the ...
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作者：Toxvaerd, Flavio
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：I study a multiperiod model of limit pricing under one-sided incomplete information. I characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence and determine when these involve limit pricing. For some parameter constellations, the unique equilibrium surviving a D1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices. For others, there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then (possibly) separate. Separation in...
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作者：Basso, Leonardo J.; Figueroa, Nicolas; Vasquez, Jorge
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Bank of Canada
摘要：We compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs: fixing either the price or quantity. For each instrument, we consider sophisticated (screening) and simple (bunching) mechanisms. We characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance. With unknown demand and increasing marginal costs, the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity, whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal ...
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作者：Bertoletti, Paolo; Etro, Federico
作者单位：University of Pavia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We provide a unified approach to imperfect (monopolistic, Bertrand, and Cournot) competition when preferences are symmetric over a finite but endogenous number of goods. Markups depend on the Morishima elasticity of substitution and on the number of varieties. The comparative statics of free-entry equilibria is examined, establishing the conditions for markup neutrality with respect to income, market size, and productivity. We compare endogenous and optimal market structures for several non-CE...
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作者：Lee, Frances Z. Xu; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：Loyola University Chicago; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We characterize how the process of publicly gathering information via discovery affects strategic interactions between litigants. It allows privately informed defendants to signal through the timing of settlement offers, with weaker ones attempting to settle prediscovery. Discovery reduces the probability of trial. Properly designed limited discovery reduces expected litigation costs. Stronger defendants gain more (lose less) from a given amount of discovery. We find that the court should gran...
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作者：De Fraja, Gianni
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This article studies how a government should distribute funds among research institutions and how it should allocate them to basic and applied research. Institutions differ in reputation and efficiency and have an information advantage. The government should award funding for basic research to induce the most productive institutions to carry out more applied research than they would like. Institutions with better reputation a do more research than otherwise identical ones, and applied research...
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作者：Ekinci, Emre
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：This article develops a career-concerns model to examine the screening function of employee referrals. First, I show that employees' reputational concerns provide them with an incentive to refer high-ability applicants. This result explains how firms that offer fixed payments, rather than bonuses contingent on the referral's posthire performance, can elicit high-ability referrals from their employees. Second, I consider the promotion competition as a potential mechanism that creates a conflict...
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作者：Rosato, Antonio
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：This article derives the optimal pricing and product-availability strategies for a retailer selling two substitute goods to loss-averse consumers and shows that limited-availability sales manipulate consumers into an ex ante unfavorable purchase. The seller maximizes profits by raising the consumers' reference point through a tempting discount on a good available only in limited supply (the bargain), and cashing in with a high price on the other (the rip-off), which consumers buy if the bargai...
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作者：Koulayev, Sergei; Rysman, Marc; Schuh, Scott; Stavins, Joanna
作者单位：Boston University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston
摘要：Motivated by recent policy intervention into payments markets, we develop and estimate a structural model of adoption and use of payment instruments by U.S. consumers. Our structural model differentiates between the adoption and use of payment instruments. We evaluate substitution among payment instruments and welfare implications. Cash is the most significant substitute to debit cards in retail settings, whereas checks are the most significant in bill-pay settings. Furthermore, low income con...
