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作者：Mak, Henry Y.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：A provider's performance report consists of his service average outcome and volume. The two variables depend on the provider's private quality type and current demand, but he can raise his average outcome by dumping vulnerable consumers. Prospective consumers infer providers' qualities from their reports. Performance reporting drives some providers to dump consumers when competition is intense, but it may not reveal providers' qualities when their average quality is high. Statistical adjustmen...
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作者：Aydin, Erdal; Kok, Nils; Brounen, Dirk
作者单位：Maastricht University; Tilburg University
摘要：This article investigates the rebound effect in residential heating, using a sample of 563,000 households in the Netherlands. Using instrumental variable and fixed-effects approaches, we address potential endogeneity concerns. The results show a rebound effect of 26.7% among homeowners, and 41.3% among tenants. We corroborate the findings through a quasiexperimental analysis, using a large retrofit subsidy program. We also document significant heterogeneity in the rebound effect, determined by...
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作者：Ghosh, Arghya; Morita, Hodaka
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：An alliance often involves one firm acquiring an equity stake in its alliance partner. We explore oligopoly models that capture the link between knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership (PEO), where alliance partners can choose the level of PEO. PEO can increase the alliance partners' profitability by inducing knowledge transfer, but the PEO itself reduces their joint profit because it induces other firms to take more aggressive actions. This trade-off endogenously determines the level ...
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作者：Jullien, Bruno; Pouyet, Jerome; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A seller has private information on the future gains from trade with a buyer, but the buyer has the option to invest to produce the good internally. Both the buyer and the seller can efficiently trade ex post under complete information. Despite the lack of information, the buyer sometimes gains by making an early contract offer to the seller. The early contract divides the different types of sellers according to their information, which renders the threat of producing the good in-house credibl...
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作者：Kalnins, Arturs; Froeb, Luke; Tschantz, Steven
作者单位：Cornell University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We find that hotel mergers increase occupancy. In some specifications, price also rises. Because these effects occur only in markets with high capacity utilization and high uncertainty, we reject simple models of price or quantity competition in favor of models of revenue management, where firms price to fill available capacity in the face of uncertain demand.
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作者：Garmon, Christopher
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Kansas City
摘要：This article analyzes the accuracy of various prospective hospital merger screening methods used by antitrust agencies and the courts. The predictions of the screening methods calculated with pre-merger data are compared with the actual post-merger price changes of 28 hospital mergers measured relative to controls. The evaluated screening methods include traditional structural measures (e.g., Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), measures derived from hospital competition models (e.g., diversion ratios...
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作者：Ho, Kate; Hogan, Joseph; Morton, Fiona Scott
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：The Medicare Part D program relies on consumer choice to provide insurers with incentives to offer low-priced, high-quality pharmaceutical insurance plans. We demonstrate that consumers switch plans infrequently and search imperfectly. We estimate a model of consumer plan choice with inattentive consumers and show that high observed premiums are consistent with insurers profiting from consumer inertia. We estimate the reduction in steady state plan premiums if all consumers were attentive. An ...
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作者：Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M.
作者单位：University of Bayreuth; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：For the procurement of complex goods, the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, scoring auctions implement the efficient allocation. If this is not feasible, the buyer must choose between a price-only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition). Bilateral negotia...
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作者：Lee, Robin S.; Schwarz, Michael
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes classic one-to-one matching models by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion and prove that unemployment is minimized with pe...
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作者：Lewis, Matthew S.; Pflum, Kevin E.
作者单位：Clemson University
摘要：Analyses of hospital mergers typically focus on acquisitions that alter local market concentration. However, as prices are negotiated between hospital systems and insurers, this focus may overlook the impact of cross-market interdependence in the bargaining outcome. Using data on out-of-market acquisitions occurring across the United States from 2000-2010, we investigate the impact of cross-market dependencies on negotiated prices. We find that prices at hospitals acquired by out-of-market sys...
