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作者：Benkard, C. Lanier; Jeziorski, Przemyslaw; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University
摘要：This article explores the application of oblivious equilibrium (OE) to highly concentrated markets. We define a natural extended notion of OE, called partially oblivious equilibrium (POE), that allows for there to be a set of strategically important firms (the dominant firms), whose firm states are always monitored by every other firm in the market. We perform computational experiments that explore the characteristics of POE, OE, and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and find that POE generall...
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作者：Montez, Joao
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：In a make-to-stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market-wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly po...
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作者：Chone, Philippe; Linnemer, Laurent
摘要：We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price-quantity schedules in an Aghion-Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes, depending on whether and how the price charged by the dominant firm depends on the quantity purchased from the rival firm. We find that the supply of rival good is distorted downward. Moreover, given the quantity supplied from the rival, the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Lamy, Laurent
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：From a theory viewpoint, the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices, also called absolute auctions, or of auctions with secret reserve prices, is somewhat puzzling despite being common. By allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret, we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge. We also analyze how buyers wit...
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作者：Hong, Harrison; Kremer, Ilan; Kubik, Jeffrey D.; Mei, Jianping; Moses, Michael
作者单位：Princeton University; University of Warwick; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Syracuse University
摘要：We estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential art auctions held by Sotheby's and Christie's. We exploit a pre determined rotation of which of these two houses holds their auction first during auction week in New York City. When the house that goes first has relatively expensive paintings compared to the other house, we find that the sale premium for the week is around 21% higher relative to the mean sale premium, and the fraction of paintings sold during the week is aro...
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作者：Reisinger, Markus; Tarantino, Emanuele
作者单位：WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; University of Mannheim
摘要：We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two-part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output-shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below-cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous ...
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作者：Huisman, Kuno J. M.; Kort, Peter M.
作者单位：Tilburg University; ASML Holding; University of Antwerp
摘要：This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. Each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level. The simultaneous analysis of timing and capacity decisions extends work on entry deterrence/accommodation to consider a timing/delay element. We find that, when applying an entry deterrence policy, the first investor, or incumbent, overinvests in capacity for two reasons. First, it delays the investment of the secon...
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作者：Dubois, Pierre; de Mouzon, Olivier; Scott-Morton, Fiona; Seabright, Paul
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Yale University
摘要：This article quantifies the relationship between market size and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry using improved, and newer, methods and data. We find significant elasticities of innovation to expected market size with a point estimate under our preferred specification of 0.23. This suggests that, on average, $2.5 billion is required in additional revenue to support the invention of one new chemical entity. This magnitude is plausible given recent accounting estimates of the cost of i...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; University of Queensland
摘要：This article analyzes patent pools and their effects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees reflect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage infringement by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all-or-n...
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作者：Schwenen, Sebastian
作者单位：Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Technical University of Munich
摘要：This article employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procurement auctions when firms are capacity constrained. Using data from the New York City procurement auctions for power generating capacity, I find that firms use simple bidding strategies to coordinate on an equilibrium that extracts high rents for all bidders. I show theoretically and empirically that the largest bidder submits the auction clearing bid. All other bidders submit inframarginal bids ...
