Deterring fraud by looking away
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Okat, Deniz
署名单位：
Aalto University
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12140
发表日期：
2016
页码：
734-747
关键词：
摘要：
Individuals being audited potentially learn how to exploit the weaknesses inherent in any audit methodology if they face the same method many times. Hence, an auditor better deters fraud by randomizing her choice of methodology over time, thereby frustrating a would-be fraudster's ability to learn. In the extreme, an auditor benefits from refusing to audit, even though audits are costless to her.
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