Understanding in-house transactions in the real estate brokerage industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Han, Lu; Hong, Seung-Hyun
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12163
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1057-1086
• 关键词: free entry; INFORMATION; demand; performance; incentives; conflicts; prices; agents

摘要

About 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America are in-house transactions, for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We examine to what extent in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic incentives as opposed to matching efficiency. Using home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for home buyers.