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作者：Miller, Nathan H.; Osborne, Matthew; Sheu, Gloria
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Toronto
摘要：We estimate pass-through with 30 years of data from the portland cement industry. Robust econometric evidence supports that fuel cost changes are more than fully transmitted downstream in the form of price changes. This validates an implicit pass-through assumption made in recent academic research and regulatory analyses. We combine the econometric results with estimates of competitive conduct obtained from the literature to evaluate the incidence of market-based CO2 regulation. Producers bear...
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作者：Obara, Ichiro; Zincenko, Federico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic Bertrand competition. We show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting. First, we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, with or without capacity constraints. Next, we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long-ru...
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作者：Song, Minjae; Nicholson, Sean; Lucarelli, Claudio
作者单位：Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：Pharmaceutical cocktails often consist of two or more drugs produced by competing firms. The component drugs are often also sold as stand-alone products. We analyze the effects of a merger between two pharmaceutical firms selling complements for colorectal cancer treatment. In this setting there are two merger effects: the standard upward pricing pressure due to firms internalizing the substitution between the stand-alone products, and an additional effect where the firms internalize the impac...
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作者：Ishihara, Akifumi
作者单位：National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
摘要：We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We show that the optimal task structure is either specialization without help or teamwork with a substantial amount of help: teamwork with a small amount of help is never optimal. Specialization with high-powered incentives can be implemented by relative performance evaluation. However, under teamwork, the evalua...
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作者：Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose; Sandor, Zsolt; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Groningen; Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We study price formation in a model of consumer search for differentiated products in which consumers have heterogeneous search costs. We provide conditions under which a pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. Search costs affect two margins-the intensive search margin (or search intensity) and the extensive search margin (or the decision to search rather than to not search at all). These two margins affect the elasticity of demand in opposite directions and whether low...
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作者：Shan, Yaping
作者单位：University of Adelaide
摘要：We study the agency problem between a firm and its research employees under several scenarios characterized by different Research and Development (R&D) unit setups. In a multiagent dynamic contracting setting, we describe the precise pattern of the optimal contract. We illustrate that the optimal incentive regime is a function of how agents' efforts interact with one another: relative performance evaluation is used when their efforts are substitutes, whereas joint performance evaluation is use...
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作者：Conlon, John R.
作者单位：University of Mississippi
摘要：This article argues that as the distribution of a firm's buyers becomes more heterogeneous, the firm's profit-maximizing quantity-discount schedule becomes less steep. First, we note that one measure of heterogeneity is the slope of the hazard function, expressed in terms of a simple crossing condition. We then show that marginal price schedules, for distributions of buyers which are more heterogeneous by this measure, are less negatively sloped in that they cross schedules for more homogeneou...
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作者：Dye, Ronald A.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study a seller of an asset who is liable for damages if the seller fails to disclose to buyers an estimate of the asset's value he knew prior to the sale. Our results include as either the damages multiplier that determines the size of the damages the seller must pay buyers increases, or as the probability the seller is caught withholding his estimate from buyers increases, the seller discloses his estimate less often, and as the precision of the seller's estimate increases, he sells a larg...
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作者：Foros, Oystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Shaffer, Greg
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Rochester
摘要：The agency model used by Apple and other digital platforms delegates retail-pricing decisions to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. Given competition both upstream and downstream, we consider how, under the agency model, retail prices depend on the firms' revenue-sharing splits and the degrees to which consumers view the platforms and the goods sold on the platforms to be substitutes. We show that the agency model may not be universally adopted even if adoption...
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作者：Bester, Helmut; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Bonn
摘要：We show that in a bilateral relation with conflicting preferences and transferable utility it is unambiguously optimal to assign the authority over project decisions to the privately informed rather than the uninformed party. This holds irrespective of the degree of conflict and the distribution of private information. Under the optimal contract, the uninformed party is protected by an exit option, which it will exert when the decision maker has not chosen the promised decision. Exit terminate...
