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作者：Branstetter, Lee; Chatterjee, Chirantan; Higgins, Matthew J.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This article estimates welfare effects of accelerated generic entry via Paragraph IV challenges. Using data from 2000-2008 for hypertension drugs in the United States, we estimate demand using a random-coefficients logit model. We find consumers gain $42 billion whereas producers lose $32.5 billion from entry. This modest $9.5 billion gain in social welfare is consistent with our observation that overall consumption does not increase after entrygeneric sales displace branded sales, shifting su...
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作者：Moeller, Marc; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：University of Bern; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：This article offers a tractable model of (oligopolistic) competition in differentiated product markets characterized by individual demand uncertainty. The main result shows that, in equilibrium, firms offer advance purchase discounts and that these discounts are larger than in the monopolistic benchmark. Competition reduces welfare by increasing the fraction of consumers who purchase in advance, that is, without (full) knowledge of their preferences.
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作者：Cabral, Luis; Natividad, Gabriel
作者单位：New York University; Universidad de Piura
摘要：We identify significant cross-selling effects in the home video industry: a 10% increase in the demand for a studio's old titles leads to a 4.7% increase in new title sales. We argue this is due to supply-side effects: studios with strong titles are better able to push other titles through retailers; and the latter push these additional supplies to consumers by means of lower prices and/or heavier advertising. Our strategy for identifying causality is based on star power effects: increases in ...
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作者：Huck, Steffen; Luenser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed. Although oligopolies benefit consumers regardless of whether prices are fixed or endogenously chosen, we find that price competition lowers efficiency as consumers pay too little attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to rec...
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作者：Dardanoni, Valentino; Li Donni, Paolo
作者单位：University of Palermo
摘要：We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs. We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss. After identifying some types which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we derive the key factors defining the demand and cost functions in each market induced by these unobservable types. These are...
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作者：Berry, Steven; Eizenberg, Alon; Waldfogel, Joel
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：A vast theoretical literature explores inefficient market structures in free-entry equilibria, and previous empirical work demonstrated that excessive entry may obtain in local radio markets. We extend that literature by relaxing the assumption that stations are symmetric, allowing for endogenous horizontal and (unobserved) vertical station differentiation. We find that, in most broadcasting formats, a social planner who takes into account the welfare of market participants eliminates 50%-60% ...
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作者：Letina, Igor
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：This article examines the effects of market structure on the variety of research projects undertaken and the amount of duplication of research. A characterization of the equilibrium market portfolio of R&D projects and the socially optimal portfolio is provided. It is shown that a merger decreases the variety of developed projects and decreases the amount of duplication of research. An increase in the intensity of competition among firms leads to an increase in the variety of developed project...
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作者：Boudreau, Kevin J.; Lakhani, Karim R.; Menietti, Michael
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment. The performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities, precisely conforming to theoretical predictions. Most participants respond negatively, whereas the highest-skilled contestants respond positively. In counterfactual simulations, we interp...
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作者：Imhof, Lorens; Kraekel, Matthias
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Tournaments create strong incentives under the assumption that the competition between the agents is balanced. If, at the outset, one agent is stronger than the other, the tournament is ex ante unbalanced and incentives break down. Handicaps can in this case restore incentives. In practice, competing agents are often overall equally strong but have different sorts of strengths. Then, competition will typically be unbalanced ex post and incentives break down, but handicaps cannot be used. We sh...
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作者：Mayo, John W.; Sappington, David E. M.
作者单位：Georgetown University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We determine when an unfettered auction will ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of a scarce input that enhances product quality and may reduce production costs. A supplier values the input for this use value and for its foreclosure value, because once the input is acquired, it is unavailable to rivals. An unfettered auction often ensures the welfare-maximizing allocation of an input increment. However, it can fail to do so when the input would increase relatively rapidly the competitive ...
