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作者:Archsmith, James; Gillingham, Kenneth T.; Knittel, Christopher R.; Rapson, David S.
作者单位:University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要:Roughly three quarters of vehicles are purchased into multi-car households. We study whether households are willing to substitute attributes, such as fuel economy, across vehicles within their portfolio. We develop a novel strategy to separately identify idiosyncratic preferences for an attribute from these within-portfolio effects. Using the universe of household vehicle registration records in California over a 6-year period, we find that two-car households exhibit strong substitution across...
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作者:Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu
作者单位:Lancaster University; University of Graz
摘要:We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high- and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.
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作者:Wang, Chengsi; Wright, Julian
作者单位:Monash University; National University of Singapore
摘要:We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing t...
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作者:Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位:University of Guelph
摘要:The canonical moral hazard model is extended to allow the agent to face endogenous and noncontractible uncertainty. The agent works for the principal and simultaneously pursues outside rewards. The contract offered by the principal thus manipulates the agent's work-life balance. The participation constraint is slack whenever it is optimal to distort the agent's work-life balance away from life compared to a symmetric-information benchmark. Then, the agent's expected utility is high and he face...
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作者:Inderst, Roman; Obradovits, Martin
作者单位:Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Innsbruck
摘要:In various countries, competition laws restrict retailers' freedom to sell their products below cost. A common rationale, shared by policymakers, consumer interest groups and brand manufacturers alike, is that such loss leading of products would ultimately lead to a race-to-the-bottom in product quality. Building on Varian's (1980) model of sales, we provide a foundation for this critique, though only when consumers are salient thinkers, putting too much weight on certain product attributes. B...
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作者:D'Annunzio, Anna; Mardan, Mohammed; Russo, Antonio
作者单位:Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Loughborough University
摘要:We study commodity taxation in markets where firms, such as Internet Service Providers, energy suppliers, and payment card platforms, adopt multi-part tariffs. We show that ad valorem taxes can correct underprovision and hence increase welfare, provided the government applies differentiated tax rates to the usage and access parts of the tariff. We obtain this result in different settings, including vertically interlinked markets, markets where firms adopt menus of tariffs to screen consumers, ...
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作者:Ellickson, Paul B.; Grieco, Paul L. E.; Khvastunov, Oleksii
作者单位:University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要:We propose and estimate a spatially aggregated discrete-choice model with overlapping consumer choice sets and demographic-driven heterogeneity that varies by chain. Our approach avoids the need to define markets ex ante and captures rich substitution patterns, even in the absence of price data. An application to the US grocery industry illustrates the importance of location, format, and the spatial distribution of consumers in shaping the competitive environment. Contrary to conventional wisd...
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作者:Fischer, Paul E.; Heinle, Mirko S.; Smith, Kevin C.
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University
摘要:We consider a cheap-talk setting with two senders and a continuum of receivers with heterogenous preferences. Each receiver is constrained to listen to one of the senders but can choose which sender to listen to. The introduction of a second sender facilitates more informative communication and even enables full communication for a large set of sender preference pairs. We use the model to assess the size and characteristics of sender audiences, the amount of information communicated, and the i...
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作者:Hefti, Andreas; Liu, Shuo
作者单位:Zurich University of Applied Sciences; University of Zurich; Peking University
摘要:We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherw...
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作者:Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolo, Vincenzo; Zanchetti, Piercarlo
作者单位:European University Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Bologna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Leicester
摘要:This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adj...