Waiting for my neighbors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gordon, Sidartha; Henry, Emeric; Murto, Pauli
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Aalto University; Aalto University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12368
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 251-282
• 关键词: LOCALIZATION; diffusion; KNOWLEDGE; adoption

摘要

We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases when neighbors stop. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players do. In addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to an additional inefficiency linked to the order in which players stop. We discuss an application to technology adoption in networks.