Input price discrimination by resale market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Shaffer, Greg
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12389
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 727-757
• 关键词: supplier encroachment; channel; output; cost

摘要

This article analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market with the higher aggregate cross-seller diversion ratio. We find that discrimination can improve allocative efficiency and present sufficient conditions, involving the pass-through rates and the market demand curvatures in the different markets, under which discrimination has positive effects on output and welfare. Our insights are relevant for the policy treatment of vertical restraints on online sales.