The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12361
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 49-77
• 关键词: service; models; pay

摘要

Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private information about their cost of effort, and they exert unobservable effort. The optimal contract menu pairs a higher probability of assignment to a valuable project with a lower bonus in case of success. In limited cases, a fixed salary may be offered to employees with high effort cost. We link our results to job design features encountered in practice.