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作者：Ale-Chilet, Jorge; Atal, Juan Pablo
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a recent case where most gynecologists in one city formed a trade association to bargain for better rates with insurance companies. After unsuccessful negotiations, the physicians jointly terminated their insurer contracts and set a minimum price. We find that subsequent realized prices coincided with Nash-Bertrand prices, and that the minimum price was barely binding. We show that these actions ensured the association's stability and increased profits. Our findings shed light on the ...
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作者：Hernandez, Cristian; Quint, Daniel; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Georgetown University
摘要：We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions, and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction. We illustrate our method on data from eBay Motors auctions. We find that unobserved heterogeneity is important, accounting for two thirds of price variation after controlling for observa...
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作者：Conlon, Christopher; Gortmaker, Jeff
作者单位：New York University; Harvard University
摘要：Differentiated products demand systems are a workhorse for understanding the price effects of mergers, the value of new goods, and the contribution of products to seller networks. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) provide a flexible random coefficients logit model which accounts for the endogeneity of prices. This article reviews and combines several recent advances related to the estimation of BLP-type problems and implements an extensible generic interface via the PyBLP package. Monte Carlo...
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作者：Gilo, David; Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We characterize collusion involving secret vertical contracts between retailers and their supplier-who are all equally patient (vertical collusion). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. Furthermore, vertical collusion can solve the supplier's inability to commit to charging the monopoly wholesale price when retailers are differentiated. The supplier pays retailers slotting allowances as a prize for adhering to the collusive scheme and rejects contract dev...
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作者：Kong, Yunmi
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：In a government auction program where first-price auctions generate significantly higher revenue than English auctions, I document evidence that bidders are uncertain about the number of auction entrants. Motivated by additional data evidence, I estimate a structural model of auctions in which rivals' participation is stochastic, allowing for bidders' risk aversion and asymmetry. Counterfactual simulations reveal that bidders' uncertainty about the number of entrants, combined with risk aversi...
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作者：Salz, Tobias; Vespa, Emanuel
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behavior was collusive, however, the assumption would be violated and one would mispredict counterfactuals. The laboratory allows us to compare predicted behavior to true counterfactuals implemented as t...
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作者：Lee, Jungho
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：I estimate a matching model of business-partnership formation to quantify the relative importance of productivity gains, financing gains, and the coordination failure of effort provision (moral hazard) among partners. Productivity gains account for 61% of the gain from the observed partnerships. For partners in the first quartile of the wealth distribution, however, financing accounts for 93% of the gain. The cost of moral hazard corresponds to 42% of the entire gain from partnerships. A loan ...
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作者：Hua, Xinyu; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A firm sells a dangerous product to heterogeneous consumers. Higher consumer types suffer accidents more often but may enjoy higher gross benefits. The firm invests resources to reduce the frequency of accidents. When the consumer's net benefit function (gross benefits minus expected harms) is decreasing in consumer type, the firm contractually accepts liability for accident losses and invests efficiently. When the consumer's net benefit function is increasing in consumer type, the firm contra...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Konrad, Kai A.; Malueg, David A.
作者单位：Tulane University; Max Planck Society; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We consider a preemption game between competing groups; firms lobbying individually for their groups' interests provide an empirical example. Among symmetric groups, the first firm to take action bears an (unobserved) cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group. In equilibrium, the firm with the lowest cost takes action, but with delay. More competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay. Firms in larger groups wait longer, but group action can occur earlier, as the proba...
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作者：Asker, John; Fershtman, Chaim; Jeon, Jihye; Pakes, Ariel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research; Tel Aviv University; Boston University; Harvard University
摘要：This article develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions and uses it to investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders. We show that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. The impact of information sharing depends on the extent of dynamics and provides support for the claim that information sharing, even of strategically ...
