Moral hazard in teams with subjective evaluations
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cheng, Chen
署名单位：
Johns Hopkins University
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12360
发表日期：
2021
页码：
22-48
关键词：
摘要：
This article studies moral hazard in teams where workers' wages depend on two types of performance measures: objective team output and subjective evaluations. The evaluations include both self- and peer evaluations. I find that when evaluations become less subjective, workers' wages should be more sensitive not only to their evaluations but also to the team's output. I also show that subjective evaluations should be used in relative terms only when the degree of subjectivity is not too high. The results also associate the introduction of a budget breaker with the level of subjectivity within organizations.
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