NOTES ON BRIBERY AND THE CONTROL OF CORRUPTION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BASU, K; BHATTACHARYA, S; MISHRA, A
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90012-5
发表日期：
1992
页码：
349-359
关键词：
摘要：
Existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem. When an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested, he has to take into account the fact that he may, in turn, be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain, but from the other side. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion. Having done so, it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption. These turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests.
来源URL：