ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONS - SPENDING AND VOTING IN SCHOOL BUDGET REFERENDA
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ROMER, T; ROSENTHAL, H; MUNLEY, VG
署名单位：
Carnegie Mellon University; Lehigh University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(92)90061-J
发表日期：
1992
页码：
1-33
关键词：
摘要：
Allocation of resources in the local public sector involves economic and political forces. In many U.S. states the bulk of spending on public education is subject to referendum. We link spending proposals to referendum outcomes. Our model makes use of voting data to shed light on the extent to which referenda constrain spending. We use data from school budget referenda in 544 New York school districts for the 1975-1976 school year. Our econometric results and simulations based on them reveal considerable sensitivity of spending to the form of the state grants-in-aid structure, as well as to the referendum requirement. In addition, large school districts appear to behave more like `budget maximizers' than do small districts, where proposals appear more in line with `median voter' demands.
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