THE COMPARISON BETWEEN AD-VALOREM AND SPECIFIC TAXATION UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DELIPALLA, S; KEEN, M
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Swansea University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90073-O
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 351-367

摘要

This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly, with and without free entry. Predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price, high tax revenue and (when entry is precluded) low profits. Ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective: the set of circumstances under which (with free entry) specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare-improving, and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation.