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作者：KANNIAINEN, V; SODERSTEN, J
作者单位：Uppsala University; University of Helsinki
摘要：A new approach to understanding the real effects of corporate taxation is suggested. Essentially, by claiming that corporate debt means discipline for the executives, the debt policy of a firm is endogenised. It is then proved that the effective profits tax rate is tied to current and expected future profitability, reflected in the marginal valuation of equity. A theoretically correct effective marginal profits tax rate cannot be estimated from historical figures. Moreover, a new tax neutralit...
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作者：MILESIFERRETTI, GM; SPOLAORE, E
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：When parties with different preferences compete for election, strategic manipulation of state variables for electoral purposes can occur even with rational voters. This paper presents a model in which government resources can be used 'productively', for the benefit of everybody, or 'unproductively', for the benefit of the ruling party's constituency. A government more inclined to unproductive spending may choose to collect public resources inefficiently in order to reduce the importance of spe...
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作者：TRANDEL, GA
摘要：This paper considers the manner in which an unequal distribution of consumers affects the commodity tax policies of neighboring jurisdictions. The paper uses a spatial model in which the residents of two states are distributed non-uniformly and employs a variety of assumptions about the behavior of governments and firms. Throughout, the paper shows that, at a Nash equilibrium in tax levels, the sparsely-populated state imposes a lower tax than does its densely-populated neighbor. The paper als...
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作者：VARIAN, HR
摘要：I examine games involving private contributions to a public good and show that less of the public good will be supplied if agents move sequentially than if they move simultaneously. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's contributions, the subsidies that support the Lindahl allocation are the unique equilibrium outcome. I also describe two related subsidy-set...
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作者：SMITH, E
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of wage and profit taxation in a simple search and bargaining model. Wage tax effects depend upon the level of unemployment benefits. If unemployment benefits are less than search costs or if benefits are taxed as income, then a wage tax decreases unemployment. It also decreases the wage, thereby overshifting the tax burden. Profit tax effects depend upon job entry. In the short run with a fixed number of jobs (filled jobs plus vacancies), a profit tax decreases...
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作者：DINWIDDY, C; TEAL, F
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship between recent theoretical work on the shadow wage rate in a tax-distorted economy and the border-price equivalent methods, recommended by Little and Mirrlees and widely used in project appraisal manuals and empirical applications.
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作者：GRUBER, J
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：One popular explanation for the low rate of employee health insurance coverage is the presence of numerous state regulations which mandate that group health insurance plans must include certain benefits. By raising the minimum cost of providing any health insurance coverage, these mandated benefits make it impossible for firms which would have desired to offer minimal health insurance at a low cost to do so. I use data on insurance coverage among employees in small firms to investigate whether...
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作者：PIKETTY, T
摘要：This paper deals with the problem of compatibility between Pareto-optimality and equal-liberty (alias envy-freeness) in economies with production, seemingly closed after Pazner and Schmeidler's counter-examples. A simple Spence-Mirrlees-like condition (demanding that the less productive jobs are also marginally the harder in terms of well-being) is proposed, under which it is proved that allocations satisfying Pareto-optimality and equal-liberty always exist. This allows us to define a well-al...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：WEIMANN, J
摘要：In standard public good experiments, it has often been observed that contributions decay and reach their minimum in the final round. Up to now there has been no convincing explanation for this phenomenon. In order to find a solution to this puzzle, a series of experiments are conducted, in which the effects of information about individual behaviour and the effects of contributions of other players on subjects' choices are investigated. Furthermore, the partner-stranger experiment of Andreoni (...
