SEQUENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO PUBLIC-GOODS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
VARIAN, HR
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90019-1
发表日期：
1994
页码：
165-186
关键词：
摘要：
I examine games involving private contributions to a public good and show that less of the public good will be supplied if agents move sequentially than if they move simultaneously. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's contributions, the subsidies that support the Lindahl allocation are the unique equilibrium outcome. I also describe two related subsidy-setting games that yield Lindahl allocations in n-person games with general utility functions.
来源URL：