COSTS OF MONITORING AND CORPORATE-TAXATION

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: KANNIAINEN, V; SODERSTEN, J
• 署名单位: Uppsala University; University of Helsinki
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90056-6
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 307-321
• 关键词: Corporate taxation; MONITORING COSTS; investment incentives

摘要

A new approach to understanding the real effects of corporate taxation is suggested. Essentially, by claiming that corporate debt means discipline for the executives, the debt policy of a firm is endogenised. It is then proved that the effective profits tax rate is tied to current and expected future profitability, reflected in the marginal valuation of equity. A theoretically correct effective marginal profits tax rate cannot be estimated from historical figures. Moreover, a new tax neutrality result in suggested. For the first time, the paper provides a choice-theoretical explanation for corporations in the Nordic countries having quite systematically chosen to abstain from maximising their interest-free tax debt capacity.