STATE-MANDATED BENEFITS AND EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH-INSURANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: GRUBER, J
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)01407-2
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 433-464
• 关键词: MANDATES; health insurance; Insurance regulation

摘要

One popular explanation for the low rate of employee health insurance coverage is the presence of numerous state regulations which mandate that group health insurance plans must include certain benefits. By raising the minimum cost of providing any health insurance coverage, these mandated benefits make it impossible for firms which would have desired to offer minimal health insurance at a low cost to do so. I use data on insurance coverage among employees in small firms to investigate whether this problem is an important cause of employee non-insurance. I find that mandates have little effect on the rate of insurance coverage; this finding is robust to a variety of specifications of the regulations. I also find that this lack of an effect may be because mandates are not binding, since most firms appear to offer these benefits even in the absence of regulation.