TAXATION IN A 2-SIDED SEARCH MODEL
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SMITH, E
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90044-2
发表日期：
1994
页码：
423-435
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the effects of wage and profit taxation in a simple search and bargaining model. Wage tax effects depend upon the level of unemployment benefits. If unemployment benefits are less than search costs or if benefits are taxed as income, then a wage tax decreases unemployment. It also decreases the wage, thereby overshifting the tax burden. Profit tax effects depend upon job entry. In the short run with a fixed number of jobs (filled jobs plus vacancies), a profit tax decreases unemployment. It also raises the wage, again overshifting the tax. In the long run, the converse holds.
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