-
作者：BUCHHOLZ, W; KONRAD, KA
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Bergen
摘要：This paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good. If the agents differ in their contribution productivity, then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent. Although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game, the less productive agent becomes a Stackelberg leader. Furthermore, the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specializati...
-
作者：BOSE, P
摘要：This paper shows that with a hierarchical structure of enforcement, regulatory errors cause the optimal penalty to be non-maximal even if offenders are risk neutral (and fines are pure transfers), and the private benefit from violation is strictly less than the social cost for all individuals. In contrast, with error-free monitoring, no finite fine is optimal within the same hierarchical structure. Also, full compliance is an equilibrium outcome in the presence of errors whereas, in the absenc...
-
作者：HAUSMAN, JA; LEONARD, GK; MCFADDEN, D
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A two-stage budgeting approach can often be taken when analyzing consumer choice situations. In this paper we examine the particular situation where a consumer makes purchases of a discrete commodity of which there are a number of brands. In the first stage, the consumer decides how many purchases to make; in the second stage, the consumer decides how to allocate these purchases across brands. Our econometric approach to this type of situation uses a utility-consistent, combined discrete choic...
-
作者：HOFF, K; LYON, AB
摘要：Economists generally have argued that income redistribution comes at a cost in aggregate income. We provide a counter-example in a model where private information gives rise to incentive constraints. In the model, a wage tax creates the usual distortion in labor-leisure choices, but the redistributive grants that it finances reduce a distortion in investment in higher education. We prove that simple redistributive policies can yield Pareto improvements and increase aggregate income. Indeed, re...
-
作者：NELISSEN, JHM
摘要：This paper looks at how the Dutch General Old-Age Pensions Act impacts the distribution of equivalent lifetime income, using a dynamic cross-sectional microsimulation model. Considering both vertical and horizontal redistributional effects, the paper shows that lifetime redistribution is considerably smaller than the redistribution measured on the basis of a period approach. The horizontal lifetime redistribution is more important than the vertical one, but this effect is rather limited, in pa...
-
作者：ARMSTRONG, M; COWAN, S; VICKERS, J
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Southampton
摘要：This paper analyzes profit-maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to price cap regulation. Two forms of regulatory constraint are considered: (i) a cap on the firm's average revenue, and (ii) a constraint that the firm must continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at the uniform price. Optimal nonlinear price schedules in these regimes are shown to have simple characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs that an unregulated monopolist would charge. Of...
-
作者：HOWITT, P; WINTROBE, R
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This paper develops a simple model of political inaction in a two-party democracy, i.e. it shows the conditions under which both parties will prefer to live with an unsatisfactory and inefficient status quo rather than to raise an issue. The risk of raising the issue to either party is the fear of ending up with the other party's policy (for example, by losing the election), regarded as even worse than the status quo. The model shows that the problem is likely to be particularly serious, the m...
-
作者：CHAKRAVORTI, B
摘要：We study dynamic procedures for the provision of an efficient level of a public good with time-dependent surplus distribution. In general, such procedures are prone to manipulation via pre-play communication among coalitions of agents. We begin with a generalization of Truchon's (Econometrica, 1984, 52, 1179-1190) elegant non-myopic MDP procedure and provide a new procedure that exhibits finite, monotone convergence to Pareto-efficiency in Subgame-Perfect Coalition-proof equilibrium. This proc...
-
作者：LOCKWOOD, B
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper considers a problem of multi-firm regulation where the regulator cannot make monetary transfers to or from firms. Otherwise, the set-up is standard; two firms charging two-part tariffs sell in separate markets, and marginal costs are private information. Without transfers, the regulator faces an additional consumer participation constraint that the representative consumer must wish to participate in the market in all states. The paper studies the second-best optimal regulatory schem...
-
作者：DUCLOS, JY
摘要：We discuss the modelling of the take-up of state support by going beyond the standard analysis and recognising that both the researcher and the welfare agency make errors is assessing entitlement. We apply the discussion to an examination of the take-up of Supplementary Benefits in Britain. By explicitly modelling the costs to taking up state support, we can illustrate how these costs can dampen the welfare impact of state support and mitigate or aggravate welfare agency errors in assessing en...
