Journal of Public Economics

最新文章

• Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment AI翻译
  作者：Lehmann, Etienne; Parmentier, Alexis; Van Der Linden, Bruno
  作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Paris Saclay; Universite Catholique Louvain
  摘要：We characterize optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. Average tax rates are increasing at the optimum. This shifts wages below their laissez faire value and distorts labor demand upwards. The marginal tax rate is positive at the top of the skill distribution even when the latter is bound...
• A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons AI翻译
  作者：Fehr, Ernst; Leibbrandt, Andreas
  作者单位：University of Chicago; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Zurich
  摘要：This paper examines the role of cooperativeness and impatience in the exploitation of common pool resources (CPRs) by combining laboratory experiments with field data. We study fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from the use of fishing grounds with open access. The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and inter-temporal externality because individuals who exploit the CPR reduce the current and the future yield both for others and for themselves. Eco...
• Political economy of Ramsey taxation AI翻译
  作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh
  作者单位：Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
  摘要：We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital tax...
• Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments AI翻译
  作者：Ambrus, Attila; Pathak, Parag A.
  作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
  摘要：This paper shows that the presence of different types of players - those who only care about their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions - can explain the robust features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the presence of asymmetric information. We show what conditions on reciprocity are sufficient for a unique perfect equilibrium, in which contributions are decreasing. Under these conditions, selfish players have en...
• Diversity and the power of the elites in democratic societies: Evidence from Indonesia AI翻译
  作者：Bandiera, Oriana; Levy, Gilat
  作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
  摘要：This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median -typically poor-agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. Theory suggests that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the wealthy elites' influence on policy choices is endogenously higher when there is diversity in preferences among the poor. The pattern of public good provision by local governments in Indonesia is consistent w...
• Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements AI翻译
  作者：Beccherle, Julien; Tirole, Jean
  作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
  摘要：The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as is well-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players' attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A brinkmanship, an effort substitution, and a rais...
• School tracking and access to higher education among disadvantaged groups AI翻译
  作者：Malamud, Ofer; Pop-Eleches, Cristian
  作者单位：Columbia University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
  摘要：When students are tracked into vocational and academic secondary schools, access to higher education is usually restricted to those who complete an academic track. Postponing such tracking may increase university attendance among disadvantaged students if additional time in school enables them to catch up with their more privileged counterparts. However, if ability and expectations are fairly well set by an early age, postponing tracking during adolescence may not have much effect. This paper ...
• Are tenured judges insulated from political pressure? AI翻译
  作者：Blanes i Vidal, Jordi; Leaver, Clare
  作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Oxford
  摘要：Tenured public officials such as judges are often thought to be insulated from political pressure and, as a result, indifferent to the concerns of the electorate. We investigate this proposition empirically using data on promotion decisions taken by senior English judges between 1985 and 2005. Throughout this period the popular view was one of ill-disciplined elitism: senior judges were alleged to be favouring candidates from elite backgrounds over their equally capable non-elite counterparts....
• Enhancing capabilities through credit access: Creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness under asymmetric information AI翻译
  作者：Becchetti, Leonardo; Conzo, Pierluigi
  作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata
  摘要：Creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms because, under asymmetric information, the act of conferring a loan has the indirect effect of signaling the trustworthiness of the borrower. We test the creditworthiness/trustworthiness nexus in an investment game experiment on a sample of participants/nonparticipants in a microfinance program in Argentina and find that trustors give significantly more to (and believe they will receive more from) microfinance borrowers. The first- and s...
• Start-up subsidies for the unemployed: Long-term evidence and effect heterogeneity AI翻译
  作者：Caliendo, Marco; Kuenn, Steffen
  作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; Free University of Berlin; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
  摘要：Turning unemployment into self-employment has become an increasingly important part of active labor market policies (ALMP) in many OECD countries. Germany is a good example where the spending on start-up subsidies for the unemployed accounted for nearly 17% of the total spending on ALMP in 2004. In contrast to other programs like vocational training, job creation schemes, or wage subsidies the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such schemes is still scarce: especially regarding long-te...