Political economy of Ramsey taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh
• 署名单位: Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.014
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 467-475
• 关键词: Capital taxation; fiscal policy; political economy

摘要

We study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the Ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self-interested politician who cannot commit to policies. We show that, as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens, the Chamley-Judd result of zero long-run taxes holds. In contrast, if the politician is less patient than the citizens, the best (subgame perfect) equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long-run capital taxation. (C) 2010 Published by Elsevier B.V.