Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beccherle, Julien; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.007
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1339-1348
• 关键词: International negotiations; climate change; Cap and trade; Bankable permits

摘要

The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as is well-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players' attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A brinkmanship, an effort substitution, and a raising rival's cost effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to the issuance of forward or bankable permits. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.