Enhancing capabilities through credit access: Creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness under asymmetric information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Becchetti, Leonardo; Conzo, Pierluigi
• 署名单位: University of Rome Tor Vergata
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.022
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 265-278
• 关键词: field experiment; microfinance; Investment game; trust; trustworthiness

摘要

Creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms because, under asymmetric information, the act of conferring a loan has the indirect effect of signaling the trustworthiness of the borrower. We test the creditworthiness/trustworthiness nexus in an investment game experiment on a sample of participants/nonparticipants in a microfinance program in Argentina and find that trustors give significantly more to (and believe they will receive more from) microfinance borrowers. The first- and second-order beliefs of trustees are also consistent with this picture. Our findings then show that MF participants appear more trustworthy and this may help microfinance to work. A related consequence is that, if (and only if) borrower's trustworthiness is not public information, the mere loan provision acts as a reputation enhancing signal increasing the borrower's attractiveness as a business partner. In such case we have a channel through which a private financial intermediary contributes to the provision of a public good like information, thereby reducing the adverse consequences of market failures on the creation of economic value. (C) 2010 Elsevier By. All rights reserved.