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作者：Li, Tad; Han, Li; Zhang, Linxiu; Rozelle, Scott
作者单位：University of Macau; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Stanford University
摘要：In a randomized trial conducted with primary school students in China, we find that pairing high and low achieving classmates as benchmates and offering them group incentives for learning improved low achiever test scores by approximately 0.265 standard deviations without harming the high achievers. Offering only low achievers incentives for learning in a separate trial had no effect. Pure peer effects at the benchmate level are not sufficiently powerful to explain the differences between thes...
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作者：Borcan, Oana; Lindahl, Mikael; Mitrut, Andreea
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; Uppsala University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Bucharest University of Economic Studies
摘要：This paper aims to understand how corruption responds to an income loss. We exploit an unexpected 25% wage cut incurred in 2010 by all Romanian public sector employees, including the public education staff. We investigate a corruptible high-stake exam taking place shortly after the wage announcement. To measure corruption we compare changes in exam outcomes from 2007 to 2010 between public and private schools, as the latter were not affected by the policy. We find that the wage loss induced be...
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作者：Barseghyan, Levon; Coate, Stephen
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper explores the provision of a durable public good in Romer and Rosenthal's agenda setter model. It identifies a type of equilibrium, called a Romer-Rosenthal equilibrium, in which in every period the bureaucrat proposes the maximum level of public investment the voter will support. The paper establishes that such an equilibrium exists for a variety of public good benefit functions. Equilibrium public good levels converge or almost converge to a steady state. These steady states can in...
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作者：Joulfaian, David
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury
摘要：Life insurance proceeds are generally subject to the estate tax. An exception is when the policy is owned by the beneficiaries and the insured gives up ownership and control, including the ability to change beneficiaries. Should the insured strategically own the policy contract and potentially subject proceeds to estate and inheritance taxes, or relinquish control, with the beneficiaries owning the policy, and escape such transfer taxes? This paper addresses how the estate tax influences the c...
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作者：Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
摘要：Evidence suggests little informed giving. To understand this behavior, we examine voluntary provision of a discrete public good with independent private values that can be ascertained at a cost. We find that an individual who considers a smaller contribution is less likely to learn her value, and thus the percentage of informed giving diminishes as the population grows. We also find that a direct grant to the charity exacerbates crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition whereas a ma...
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作者：Adams, Laurel; Regibeau, Pierre; Rockett, Katharine
作者单位：Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Essex
摘要：A national authority wishes to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to create local jobs. We analyse the optimal national trade policy when local authorities might offer subsidies to convince a multi-national enterprise (MNE) to invest in their jurisdiction. With centralised decision-making or with allocation of investment to particular localities, the central authority's optimal policy is to use a high tariff to avoid payment of any subsidy to the MNE. Despite this, some socially undesirab...
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作者：Han, Yutao; Pieretti, Patrice; Zanaj, Skerdilajda; Zou, Benteng
作者单位：University of International Business & Economics; University of Luxembourg
摘要：This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and public input competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision-making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional...
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作者：Crawford, Rowena; Disney, Richard
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London
摘要：We analyse pension reforms for police officers in England and Wales using force-level data. We quantify the impact on overall police pension plan liabilities, examining incidence across police officers, national and local taxpayers. We also examine reforms of retirement rules, especially concerning early retirement on grounds of ill-health. Differences in ill-health retirement across forces are statistically related to area-specific stresses of policing and force-specific human resource polici...
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作者：Beekman, Gonne; Bulte, Erwin; Nillesen, Eleonora
作者单位：Wageningen University & Research; Maastricht University
摘要：We analyze how corruption affects incentives to invest or contribute to public goods. We obtain a proxy for corruption among Liberian community leaders by keeping track of a flow of inputs associated with a development intervention, measuring these inputs before and after giving them in custody to the chief. We then use the gap between these measurements (missing inputs) to explain variation in investment behavior of villagers. Investment behavior is gauged with two simple artefactual field ex...
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作者：Scharf, Kimberley
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other hand, face verification constraints that make them less flexible relative to private donations. Switching from direct grants to government subsidies for private donations can thus produce a positive pro-c...
