Impure prosocial motivation in charity provision: Warm-glow charities and implications for public funding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Scharf, Kimberley
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.10.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 50-57
• 关键词: private provision of public goods; Warm glow; Tax incentives for giving; Competition in the nonprofit sector

摘要

We show that warm-glow motives in provision by competing suppliers can lead to inefficient charity selection. In these situations, discretionary donor choices can promote efficient charity selection even when provision outcomes are non-verifiable. Government funding arrangements, on the other hand, face verification constraints that make them less flexible relative to private donations. Switching from direct grants to government subsidies for private donations can thus produce a positive pro-competitive effect on charity selection, raising the value of charity provision per dollar of funding. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.