(Un)Informed charitable giving (Reprinted from Journal of Public Economics, vol 106, pg 14-26, 2013)

• 成果类型: Reprint
• 署名作者: Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.11.010
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 108-120
• 关键词: Charitable giving; value of information; Crowding-out

摘要

Evidence suggests little informed giving. To understand this behavior, we examine voluntary provision of a discrete public good with independent private values that can be ascertained at a cost. We find that an individual who considers a smaller contribution is less likely to learn her value, and thus the percentage of informed giving diminishes as the population grows. We also find that a direct grant to the charity exacerbates crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition whereas a matching grant increases donations by encouraging it. We further show that with costly information, a (first-order) stochastic increase in values can decrease donations; and that facilitating private acquisition of information can be a better fund-raising strategy than directly supplying it. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier B.V.