The impact of an unexpected wage cut on corruption: Evidence from a Xeroxed exam

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Borcan, Oana; Lindahl, Mikael; Mitrut, Andreea
• 署名单位: University of Gothenburg; Uppsala University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Bucharest University of Economic Studies
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 32-47
• 关键词: Austerity measures; bribes; Public school principals; High-stakes exam

摘要

This paper aims to understand how corruption responds to an income loss. We exploit an unexpected 25% wage cut incurred in 2010 by all Romanian public sector employees, including the public education staff. We investigate a corruptible high-stake exam taking place shortly after the wage announcement. To measure corruption we compare changes in exam outcomes from 2007 to 2010 between public and private schools, as the latter were not affected by the policy. We find that the wage loss induced better exam outcomes in public than in private schools and we attribute this difference to increased corruption by public educators. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.