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作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Kelly, David L.
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：We consider a two period model of optimal regulation of a firm subject to marginal compliance cost shocks. The regulator faces an asymmetric information problem: the firm knows current compliance costs, but the regulator does not. Both the regulator and the firm are uncertain about future costs. In our basic framework, the regulator may not offer payments to the firm; we show that the regulator can vary the strength of regulation over time to induce the firm to reveal its costs and increase we...
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作者：Enikolopov, Ruben
作者单位：Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; New Economic School
摘要：The paper argues that for political reasons elected politicians are more likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution than appointed bureaucrats. It uses the example of patronage jobs in the U.S. local governments to provide empirical support for this claim. It shows that the number of public employees is higher for elected chief executives. This difference is stronger in public services with bigger private-public wage differential and it increases during election years. It also finds that ...
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作者：Guererk, Oezguer; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina
作者单位：RWTH Aachen University; University of Cologne; University of Cologne
摘要：Economic interactions often take place in open communities, where agents are free to leave in order to join a more preferred community. Tiebout (1956) conjectured that voting with feet might generate considerable efficiency gains, since individuals with different preferences sort themselves into those communities that suit them most. We provide new empirical insights into Tiebout's intuition by showing that self-selection in open heterogeneous communities can significantly foster communities' ...
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作者：Agranov, Marina; Tergiman, Chloe
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of British Columbia
摘要：One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents. However, all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to - and do - engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal. We conduct an experimental test of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap-talk communica...
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作者：Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, Jesus; Rapoport, Hillel
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; Bar Ilan University
摘要：International migration is maybe the single most effective way to alleviate global poverty. When a given host country allows more immigrants in, this creates costs and benefits for that particular country as well as a positive externality for individuals and governments who care about world poverty. Host countries quite often restrict immigration due to its important social and political costs, however these costs are never measured and made comparable across countries. In this paper we first ...
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作者：Koethenbuerger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Using an agency model of firm behavior, the paper analyzes whether the cost of investment should be tax exempt. The findings suggest that when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is tax deductible, as commonly advocated. The extent to which the return on investment should be taxed depends on how the internal provision of incentive pay and external monitoring by banks interact in constraining the manager and whether retained earnings o...
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作者：Gehlbach, Scott; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We present a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time. Media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the government has a particular interest in mobilizing citizens to take actions that further some political objective but are not necessarily in citizens' individual best interest; however, the distinction between state and private media is smaller. Large advertising markets reduce media bia...
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作者：Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth
摘要：How can we know how much racial animus costs a black presidential candidate, if many people lie to surveys? I suggest a new proxy for an area's racial animus from a non-survey source: the percent of Google search queries that include racially charged language. I compare the proxy to Barack Obama's vote shares, controlling for the vote share of the previous Democratic presidential candidate, John Kerry. An area's racially charged search rate is a robust negative predictor of Obama's vote share....
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作者：Levy, Nadav; Pauzner, Ady
作者单位：Reichman University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Public projects typically generate both monetary revenue and social benefits that cannot be monetized. We show that a government concerned with the credit rating of its debt should put different discount rates on these two aspects. The credit rating reflects the probability of default on the government's debt and thus affects its financing costs. Monetary revenues, which can be used in financial distress to repay debt, improve the credit rating and thus carry an additional credit-market value ...
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作者：Allcott, Hunt; Mullainathan, Sendhil; Taubinsky, Dmitry
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：We analyze optimal policy when consumers of energy-using durables undervalue energy costs relative to their private optima. First, there is an Internality Dividend from Externality Taxes: aside from reducing externalities, they also offset distortions from underinvestment in energy efficiency. Discrete choice simulations of the auto market suggest that the Internality Dividend could more than double the social welfare gains from a carbon tax at marginal damages. Second, we develop the Internal...
