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作者：Mattozzi, Andrea; Merlo, Antonio
作者单位：European University Institute; Rice University
摘要：We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that when political talent is scarce this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems. (C) 2015 Elsev...
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作者：Dippel, Christian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：I use a unique dispute between major aid donors in the International Whaling Commission (WC) to investigate whether donor nations change their aid giving in response to changes in aid recipients' voting behavior inside international organizations (IOs). This relationship is difficult to pin down in most IOs because agenda items constantly change and donor coalitions fluctuate with them. I exploit the fact that the IWC has, on the one hand, seen two fixed aid donor blocs opposing each other for...
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作者：Goldin, Jacob
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Recent empirical work finds that consumers under-account for commodity taxes when the after-tax price is not prominent. I investigate how policymakers may utilize such low-salience taxes to promote welfare. The optimal combination of high- and low-salience taxes balances two competing effects: low-salience taxes dampen distortionary substitution but cause consumers to misallocate their budgets. Using a stylized model, I show the availability of taxes with differing salience provides an extra d...
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作者：Shu, Pian
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper provides empirical evidence of the existence of forward-looking asset-accumulation behavior among disability-insurance applicants, previously examined only in the theoretical literature. Using panel data from the RAND Health and Retirement Study, I show that rejected applicants for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) possess significantly more assets than accepted applicants immediately prior to application and exhibit lower attachment to the labor force. These empirical res...
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作者：Fisman, Raymond; Jakiela, Pamela; Kariv, Shachar
作者单位：Boston University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：To better understand how support for redistributive policies is shaped by macroeconomic shocks, we explore how distributional preferences changed during the recent Great Recession. We conducted identical modified dictator games during both the recession and the preceding economic boom. The experiments capture subjects' selfishness (the weight on one's own payoff) and equality-efficiency tradeoffs (concerns for reducing differences in payoffs versus increasing total payoffs), which we then comp...
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作者：Li, Sanxi; Sun, Hailin; Yan, Jianye; Yu, Jun
作者单位：Renmin University of China; People's Bank of China; Tsinghua University; University of International Business & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper investigates the principal's bundling decision during a procurement auction for a project consisting of two sequential tasks, in which task externality exists and information arrives sequentially. We show that, although increasing the number of bidders in the market for the second task always tilts the principal's choice toward unbundling, increasing the number of consortiums that can perform both tasks tilts the principal's preference toward bundling if the externality is negative....
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作者：Jantti, Markus; Pirttila, Jukka; Selin, Hakan
作者单位：Stockholm University; Tampere University
摘要：The Nordic model relies on high tax rates to finance an extensive welfare state. If labour supply elasticities are large, the burden of financing the model can be large even if, arguably, the practice of providing subsidised goods that support labour supply is likely to mitigate these effects. We utilise repeated cross sections of micro data from several countries, including the four major Nordic countries, available from the Luxembourg Income Study, LIS, to estimate labour supply elasticities...
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作者：Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie Claire
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; Universite de Rennes; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; Chapman University System; Chapman University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student-subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a game with positive externalities (based on a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism) and a similar game with negative externalities. Depending on the treatment, a reward or sanction institution is either exogenously or endogenously implemented. Police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games and be...
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作者：Barr, Andrew; Turner, Sarah
作者单位：University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The Great Recession brought large increases in unemployment and college enrollment; we examine how changing state labor market conditions and state-specific variation in Unemployment Insurance (UI) interact to affect enrollment outcomes. We identify a substantial role of the UI program in affecting post-secondary enrollment choices. We provide some of the first evidence that the duration of UI affects a displaced individual's propensity to enroll, and suggestive evidence that these effects are...
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作者：Hindriks, Jean; Nishimura, Yukihiro
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Osaka
摘要：This paper reexamines the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94: 768-776, 2010), which shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing game. They obtained this result in a model where the asymmetry among regions translates into different gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercepts. In this paper, we simply reverse the form of asymmetry by considering different vertical intercepts but identical gradient...
