Optimal tax salience

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goldin, Jacob
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 115-123
• 关键词: Behavioral economics; optimal taxation; tax salience

摘要

Recent empirical work finds that consumers under-account for commodity taxes when the after-tax price is not prominent. I investigate how policymakers may utilize such low-salience taxes to promote welfare. The optimal combination of high- and low-salience taxes balances two competing effects: low-salience taxes dampen distortionary substitution but cause consumers to misallocate their budgets. Using a stylized model, I show the availability of taxes with differing salience provides an extra degree of freedom that can be used to implement the first-best welfare outcome. I characterize the optimal policy and derive a formula for incremental adjustments when the first-best is unattainable. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.