Norm enforcement in social dilemmas: An experiment with police commissioners

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dickinson, David L.; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie Claire
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; Universite de Rennes; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; Chapman University System; Chapman University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 74-85
• 关键词: Norm enforcement; SANCTIONS; rewards; Voluntary contribution mechanism; police; experiment

摘要

Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student-subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a game with positive externalities (based on a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism) and a similar game with negative externalities. Depending on the treatment, a reward or sanction institution is either exogenously or endogenously implemented. Police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games and bear a higher burden of the sanction costs compared to non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, subjects favor rewards over sanctions, but police subjects are more likely to vote for sanctions. Police subjects also reward and sanction more than the others when the institution results from a majority vote. Our experiment suggests that lab evidence on social dilemma games with positive or negative externalities and enforcement institutions is rather robust. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.