Mediocracy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mattozzi, Andrea; Merlo, Antonio
• 署名单位: European University Institute; Rice University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.07.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 32-44
• 关键词: politicians; PARTIES; Political recruitment; electoral systems

摘要

We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that when political talent is scarce this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.