Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Sanxi; Sun, Hailin; Yan, Jianye; Yu, Jun
• 署名单位: Renmin University of China; People's Bank of China; Tsinghua University; University of International Business & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.09.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 96-106
• 关键词: auction; bundling; Design-bid-build; Design-build; procurement; Public-Private Partnerships

摘要

This paper investigates the principal's bundling decision during a procurement auction for a project consisting of two sequential tasks, in which task externality exists and information arrives sequentially. We show that, although increasing the number of bidders in the market for the second task always tilts the principal's choice toward unbundling, increasing the number of consortiums that can perform both tasks tilts the principal's preference toward bundling if the externality is negative. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.