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作者：Acikgoez, Oemer T.
作者单位：Yeshiva University
摘要：I prove existence of stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in Bewley economies with production under specifications in which (i) the utility function is allowed to be unbounded, and (ii) the underlying discrete idiosyncratic productivity process can take any form, aside from mild restrictions. Some of the intermediate results provide theoretical basis for assumptions often made in the quantitative macroeconomics literature. By providing an example, I illustrate that the equilibrium is n...
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作者：Hefti, Andreas
作者单位：Zurich University of Applied Sciences; University of Zurich
摘要：This article presents a tractable framework that embeds the allocation of limited attention into competition theory. Motivated by evidence from psychology and marketing a setting is studied where firms can manipulate consumer attention and compete in prices among perceived alternatives. The introduction of limited attention changes the positive and normative predictions obtained from otherwise standard models, such as Salop-style competition. Further, the model identifies when limited attentio...
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作者：Bajaj, Ayushi
作者单位：Monash University
摘要：Decentralized markets where assets are useful as media of exchange are also usually subject to private information. To analyze the liquidity and prices of such assets, I adapt the Shi (1995), Trejos and Wright (1995) model with Lucas trees under adverse selection. While most studies focus on either a pooling or separating equilibrium, I apply the undefeated equilibrium refinement by Mailath et al. (1993) to make the selection based on fundamentals. Under pooling, the high-quality asset holder ...
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作者：Koch, Christian; Penczynski, Stefan P.
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of East Anglia
摘要：In explaining the winner's curse, recent approaches have focused on one of two cognitive processes: conditional reasoning and belief formation. We provide the first joint experimental analysis of the role of these two obstacles. First, we observe that overbidding decreases significantly between a simple common-value auction and a transformed version of this auction that does not require conditional reasoning. Second, assistance in belief formation leads to comparable behavioral changes in both...
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作者：Beccuti, Juan; Moeller, Marc
作者单位：University of Bern
摘要：This paper considers dynamic bilateral trade with short-term commitment. We show that, when the seller is more patient than the buyer, there exist systematic differences between the optimal selling and renting mechanisms. While the former consists of simple price-posting, the latter induces the buyer to choose between a secure- and a random-delivery contract. Allowing for mechanisms more general than price-posting reduces the seller's cost of learning the buyer's valuation in the renting case....
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作者：Gonzalez, Francisco M.; Lazkano, Itziar; Smulders, Sjak A.
作者单位：University of Waterloo; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee; Tilburg University
摘要：We show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias, which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience. This underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations. We explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time. We argue that future bias creates incentives to...
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作者：Rahi, Rohit; Zigrand, Jean-Pierre
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations. Private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price. We study the learning externalities that arise in this setting, and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare. When private signals are noisy, so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices, discouraging information gathering may be Pareto improving. Complementarities in informa...
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作者：Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this result explains the predominant role of single-peakedness as a domain restriction in models of political economy and elsewhere. The main result has a number of corollaries, among them a dual characteriza...
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作者：Anderson, Edward; Holmberg, Par
作者单位：University of Sydney; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Cambridge
摘要：We consider a uniform-price procurement auction with indivisible units and private independent costs. We find an explicit solution for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is unique if demand shocks are sufficiently evenly distributed. The equilibrium has a price instability in the sense that a minor change in a supplier's realized cost can result in a drastic change in the market price. We quantify the resulting volatility and show that it is reduced as the size of indivisible units decreases. ...
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作者：Baeuerle, Nicole; Jaskiewicz, Anna
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Wroclaw University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies a one-sector optimal growth model with i.i.d. productivity shocks that are allowed to be unbounded. The utility function is assumed to be non-negative and unbounded from above. The novel feature in our framework is that the agent has risk sensitive preferences in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (1995). Under mild assumptions imposed on the productivity and utility functions we prove that the maximal discounted non-expected utility in the infinite time horizon satisfies the o...
