Inefficient stage Nash is not stable

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Norman, Thomas W. L.
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.009
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 275-293
• 关键词: Repeated games; Strategic stability; evolutionary stability

摘要

It is shown that, in infinitely-repeated games between two arbitrarily patient players, strategy profiles with inefficient pure stage-Nash continuations are not strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). By contrast, a set of strategy profiles similar to the Prisoners' Dilemma's perfect tit-for-tat is uniformly robust to perfect entrants (Swinkels, 1992), and hence contains a strategically stable set. Moreover, this set satisfies iterated dominance and a version of forward induction, whilst its stable subset is admissible. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.