Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 58-87
• 关键词: Repeated games; private monitoring; Recursive methods; Concave games

摘要

We provide a simple upper bound on the Nash equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bound admits a tractable recursive characterization and can thus be applied off-the-shelf' to any repeated game. The bound is not tight in general, but it is tight if the stage game is concave or if a certain form of observable mixed actions is allowed. We illustrate our results with applications to the repeated prisoners' dilemma and to canonical public goods and oligopoly games. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.