Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Skowron, Piotr; Faliszewski, Piotr; Slinko, Arkadii
• 署名单位: University of Warsaw; AGH University of Krakow; University of Auckland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.011
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 244-273
• 关键词: Multiwinner voting; axioms; social choice; axiomatic characterization; Committee scoring rules

摘要

Committee scoring rules form a rich class of aggregators of voters' preferences for the purpose of selecting subsets of candidates of a given size. We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules in the spirit of celebrated Young's characterization of single-winner scoring rules. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms: symmetry, consistency, continuity and Pareto dominance. In the course of our proof, we introduce and axiomatically characterize multiwinner decision scoring rules, a class of rules that generalizes the well-known majority relation. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.