Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sotomayor, Marilda
• 署名单位: Universidade de Sao Paulo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.013
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1030-1056
• 关键词: Sequential stability; Perfect competitive equilibrium; Equal treatment property; Sequential games; Extended markets; core

摘要

We replicate the Multiple-partners game of Sotomayor (1992) to yield a sequence with infinitely many terms. Each term, with more than one stage, is endowed with a structure of subgames given by the previous terms. The concepts of sequential stability and of perfect competitive equilibrium are introduced and characterized. We show that there is a subsequence, such that, for all its terms, these concepts, as well as the traditional concepts of stability and of competitive equilibrium, lead to the same set of allocations, which may be distinct of the core. This not always hold for the terms out of that subsequence. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.