Intermediation in markets for goods and markets for assets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nosal, Ed; Wong, Yuet-Yee; Wright, Randall
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY; Zhejiang University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 876-906
• 关键词: middlemen; intermediation; search; bargaining; multiplicity

摘要

We analyze agents' decisions to act as producers or intermediaries using equilibrium search theory. Extending previous analyses in various ways, we ask when intermediation emerges and study its efficiency. In one version of the framework, meant to resemble retail, middlemen hold goods, which entails (storage) costs; that model always displays uniqueness and simple transition dynamics. In another version, middlemen hold assets, which entails negative costs, i.e., positive returns; that model can have multiple equilibria and complicated belief-based dynamics. These results are consistent with the venerable view that intermediation in financial markets is more prone to instability than in goods markets. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.