Repeated implementation: A practical characterization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azacis, Helmuts; Vida, Peter
• 署名单位: Cardiff University; CY Cergy Paris Universite
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 336-367
• 关键词: Repeated implementation; Dynamic monotonicity; EFFICIENCY; repeated games; Sufficient and necessary conditions

摘要

We characterize the social choice functions that are repeatedly implementable. The necessary and sufficient condition is formulated in terms of the equilibrium payoff set of an associated repeated game. It follows that the implementability of a function can be tested numerically by approximating the equilibrium payoff set. Additionally, with the help of our characterization, we demonstrate that an efficient function is implementable if and only if it satisfies a weaker version of Maskin monotonicity. As an application, we prove that utilitarian social choice functions are implementable by showing that continuation payoff promises effectively play the role of side-payments, which are needed for implementation in static setups. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.