Matching with single-peaked preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bade, Sophie
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 81-99
• 关键词: Matching; single-peaked preferences; Gale's top trading cycles; Obvious strategyproofness

摘要

The crawler is a new efficient, strategyproof, and individually rational mechanism for housing markets with single-peaked preferences. In a housing market each agent is endowed with exactly one house. These houses are ordered - by their size for example - and all agents preferences are single-peaked with respect to that order. The crawler screens agents in order of their houses' sizes, starting with the smallest. The first agent who does not want to move to a larger house is matched with his most preferred house. Agents who currently occupy houses sized between this agent's original and chosen houses crawl to the next largest unmatched house. This process is repeated until all agents are matched. The crawler is easier to understand than Gale's top trading cycles and can be extended to allow for indifferences. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.