What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Lehrer, Ehud
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.007
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 197-237
• 关键词: Discounted repeated games; Observable payoffs; Efficient payoffs; Information matrix; Sequential equilibrium

摘要

We consider two-player repeated games, where the players observe their own payoffs with a positive probability. Typically, a player observes neither the other's actions nor her own payoffs. We show that when costly communication is available to the players and when they are patient enough, being aware of her own payoffs suffices to provide the players with any strictly efficient payoff by sequential equilibrium. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.