Learning about analysts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 304-335
• 关键词: Analysts; career concerns; Reputations; social learning

摘要

We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's ability. The recommendations of the analyst influence asset prices that are then used to evaluate the analyst. An endogeneity problem thus arises. In particular, if the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high then an incompetent but strategic analyst is able to momentarily hide her type. An equilibrium in which the market eventually learns the analyst type always exists. However, under some conditions, an equilibrium also exists in which the incompetent analyst is able to hide her type forever. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.